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On 5 August 2019, India’s home minister Amit Shah made a shock an-
nouncement revoking India’s constitutional guarantee of autonomy to the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. This article focuses on the wider ideological 
context of Hindu nationalism that has spurred this decision in order to as-
sess the move’s far-reaching implications for Indian democracy and peace 
in South Asia.
 • In addition to the revocation of autonomy, a key condition of Kashmir’s acces-
sion to India, India has further partitioned the state into two parts and down-
graded its status to a centrally administered territory. This consolidation of 
the hard-line stance taken by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government in 
Kashmir since assuming power is bound to fuel further alienation and resent-
ment.
 • The unilateral decision calls into question India’s other federal arrangements 
too – for instance, with states in India’s north-east that also enjoy various de-
grees of autonomy, increasing the chance of disaffection and instability within 
the country.
 • The decision also has the potential to spark tensions with Pakistan and China, 
both of which occupy portions of Kashmir’s territory. Pakistan, which lays claim 
to the entire Muslim-majority province, has already downgraded its diplomatic 
relations with India. China, which claims rights to the north-eastern portion of 
Kashmir, has also issued a warning. 
 • Increased disaffection among the Kashmiri population is also likely to spur 
inter vention by non-state Islamic groups, resulting in long-term strife.
Policy Implications
According to a Hindu Right dictum, only a display of might will get India its due 
in the world. This high-risk manoeuvre in Kashmir appears to be the Modi gov-
ernment’s way of testing this axiom. The consolidation of Hindu nationalist pol-
itics in India suggests the government is likely to take a more belligerent stance 
in world politics, especially in issues concerning national security. EU decision-
makers can expect to deal with a more uncompromising and hard-line India in 
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The End of Kashmir’s Special Status
On 5 August 2019, India’s home minister Amit Shah made three interrelated an-
nouncements: that, with immediate effect, India was revoking Jammu and Kash-
mir’s autonomy within the Indian constitution; that it was partitioning the state in 
two; and that the ensuing entities would henceforth be administered directly by the 
central government. This decision, which alters the status of a contested region in 
South Asia – and the unilateral manner of its execution – bespeaks the ascendance 
of an assertive Hindu nationalism in India. It signals a significant departure from 
India’s apparently restrained and conciliatory approach to conflict management 
and is bound to affect its stance in world politics. 
This GIGA Focus provides a historical background to the current developments 
with regard to Kashmir, places it within the context of political developments in 
New Delhi, and unravels the consequences that a consolidation of Hindu national-
ism in India will have for the country’s international engagements.
Historical Background 
Jammu and Kashmir’s (in short, also “Kashmir”) special status within India, grant-
ing it the right to have its own constitution, flag, and the entitlement to determine 
its permanent residents, was a result of the protracted negotiations that led to the 
former princely state acceding to the Indian union. Kashmir was one among the 
nearly 560 “princely states” comprising close to 40 per cent of British Indian terri-
tory at the time of the simultaneous independence and partition of the subcontinent 
in August 1947. In the lead-up to British departure, most of these states were per-
suaded to accede to either India or Pakistan based on territorial contiguity and/or 
the religious composition of the population. 
Kashmir, a Muslim-majority province ruled by a Hindu Maharaja (king), Hari 
Singh, sought to remain independent, even as both India and Pakistan laid claim 
to it. Both countries’ claim to Kashmir was based to a certain extent on the region’s 
Muslim-majority status: while Pakistan claimed all Muslim-majority regions within 
the erstwhile British India, for India it offered an opportunity to showcase its multi­
cultural, secular ethos. In an attempt to force the issue, Pakistan sent in its armed 
forces disguised as tribals to take over the territory in October 1947. Pushed into a 
corner, the Maharaja turned to India for help. India, in turn, agreed to send in its 
forces immediately, but on the condition that the Maharaja sign the instrument of 
accession to India. As per this instrument, Kashmir was to have autonomy in all af-
fairs except foreign relations, defence, and communications. Sheikh Abdullah, one 
of the most popular leaders of Kashmir’s freedom and anti-monarchical struggle, 
also lent support to Kashmir joining a secular and democratic India – on the condi-
tion that Kashmir’s autonomy be respected. 
On Sheikh Abdullah’s insistence, Kashmir’s special status was further en-
shrined into the Indian constitution in 1952 in the form of Article 370. It was to 
be the privilege of the Jammu and Kashmir constitutional assembly to decide if 
any further subjects would be ceded to the central government. Article 35A of the 
Indian constitution further underwrote Kashmir’s right to determine its permanent 
   3    GIGA FOCuS | ASIA | NO. 5 | AuGuST 2019 
residents and, among other things, restricted ownership of land within the state to 
these permanent residents. 
A Symbolic Move of Far-Reaching Significance
It is these two articles that have now been invalidated as a result of the presidential 
order announced by the home minister on 5 August. Not just that, the state has been 
divided into two – Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh – with the two parts down-
graded to the status of union territories that will be governed directly by the centre. 
While the government has offered no rationale for this bifurcation, it is assumed 
that it is in response to a long-standing demand by the representatives of Ladakh’s 
Buddhist population (41 per cent of the population) that the region be separated 
from Kashmir. From being a state with special powers underwritten by the Indian 
constitution, Kashmir has now effectively been rendered far less autonomous than 
other states within the Indian federation.
This is humiliating for a people that has agitated either for outright independ-
ence or more autonomy within the Indian union. Kashmir’s accession to India – al-
though endorsed by the ruler of Kashmir as well as the leader of a popular national 
movement in Kashmir – has remained contentious. India’s first prime minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, had committed to Kashmir’s future being decided by the wishes 
of its people, but India has never held the plebiscite mandated by the united Na-
tions’ Security Council (uNSC) in 1948. India’s excuse for the failure to implement 
the plebiscite is that Pakistan did not keep its side of the bargain and did not with-
draw from the part of Kashmir it held (Noorani 2011). A key condition of the pleb-
iscite resolution was that it take place in the entirety of the former princely state 
of Jammu and Kashmir. At present Kashmir is divided between India, Pakistan, 
and China. India’s bifurcation of the portion it holds further dilutes the territorial 
integrity of the province.
Moreover, successive central governments have, in consonance with Jammu 
and Kashmir’s governments, diluted the provisions of autonomy (Noorani 2011). 
Together with heavy militarisation of the region this has meant that, in practice, the 
autonomy enjoyed by Kashmir has been largely symbolic. It has nevertheless been 
vested with immense significance. 
For one, it provided a fig leaf of legitimacy to India’s claim to Kashmir. It was 
also an article of faith for the unionists – those within Kashmir supporting the 
state’s accession to India. Its revocation essentially transforms Kashmir into an In-
dian colony, confirming the worst fears of its citizens. This is further underscored by 
the nullification of Article 35A, which, among other things, limited land ownership 
in Jammu and Kashmir, sparking anxiety that the ultimate aim of the central gov-
ernment is to alter the demographic composition of the region through settlement 
from the rest of India – akin to what China has done with respect to Tibet – and 
in this manner render the dispute moot. India’s actions in this regard are a major 
climbdown for a country that has thus far built its reputation on its anti-colonial 
credentials. Given that Article 370 sets out the constitutional relationship between 
India and Kashmir, its revocation, it can be argued, ends this relationship. As Meh-
booba Mufti, a former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, who until recently 
headed the coalition government in Kashmir together with the BJP, tweeted after 
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the shock announcement of 5 August, “the abrogation of Article 370 hasn’t just 
made accession null and void but also reduces India to an occupation force in Jam-
mu and Kashmir” (Mufti 2019). She is now under detention.
Subterfuge and Repression
The Indian government has argued that the revocation of the special status accord-
ed to Kashmir has been undertaken with the aim of integrating Kashmiris into the 
Indian mainstream and to accord to them the same rights that other Indians enjoy. 
Yet the government’s actions and the unilateral and surreptitious manner in which 
the decision was sprung belies this claim. There was not even a semblance of consul-
tation with the people of Kashmir. Instead, in the days leading up to the announce-
ment, the government used the ruse of a purported terrorist threat to put Kashmir 
under a severe lockdown: in addition to those already stationed there, thousands 
of military troops were sent in; strict movement restrictions were imposed on the 
popu lation and an unprecedented communication blockade set in place. Confined 
to their houses with access to television, internet, mobile phones, and even land-
lines cut off, the people of Kashmir probably did not even hear the Indian home 
minister make the announcement that is supposed to integrate them into the main-
stream of Indian politics. Kashmiri politicians and civil society activists, including 
those with a pro-India stance, among them two former chief ministers of the state, 
Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti, were taken into preventive custody. 
The rest of the Indians were equally subject to their democratically elected gov-
ernment’s subterfuge and disinformation campaign. Rumours of imminent terror-
ist attacks and the recovery of caches of weapons on the border with Pakistan did 
the rounds as a way of explaining away the lockdown in Kashmir. An annual Hindu 
pilgrimage to a shrine in the valley was abruptly cancelled and tourists were advised 
to leave. The home minister’s sudden announcement of the government’s decision 
to rescind Kashmir’s autonomy via a presidential decree to take effect immediately 
left no scope for any discussion in the Indian Parliament either.
Further, the amendment of a constitutional provision via a presidential decree 
is legally questionable. Any amendment to the Indian constitution requires the as-
cent of two-thirds of the members in both houses of the Indian Parliament. The BJP 
has the requisite numerical strength to have pushed the amendment through, yet 
it chose not to follow this path. Instead it has been touting its brute majority post 
facto as giving it the mandate to execute the majoritarian will (Varshney 2019). As 
an additional safeguard in the constitution, no change could be made to Article 370 
without the consent of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. With the assembly 
having been dissolved in 1956, the government has argued that this function can be 
taken over by the legislative assembly of Kashmir. The legislative assembly of Kash-
mir, however, has been suspended since November 2018, following the breakdown 
of the coalition government in place there. So the government has instead taken the 
consent of the centrally appointed governor of Kashmir. 
Replacing the function of a duly elected legislative body with a federally ap-
pointed person amounts, at best, to a legal sleight of hand. The ease and alacrity 
with which the government has altered a key constitutional guarantee raises con-
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cerns about India as a constitutional democracy, rendering tenuous the constitu-
tional safeguards that it offers its citizens. 
Moreover, Kashmir was not the only state of the union to have special rights. 
In its effort to bring diverse peoples and regions into the union, India offered sev-
eral states various constitutional and other concessions. Kashmir, for instance, 
was not the only state where the sale of land was regulated – eight other states 
(Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Sikkim, and 
Himachal Pradesh) continue to have similar restrictions. Article 371 of the Indian 
constitution accords autonomy with respect to religious and social practices, cus-
tomary law, and land rights in states in the north-east of India, on the border with 
Bangladesh, China, and Myanmar. There is even an inner-line permit system – a 
sort of internal visa system – restricting entry of people from “mainland India” into 
Arunchal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Nagaland. 
The government’s action with respect to Kashmir also puts a question mark on 
these asymmetric arrangements, which have helped accommodate divergent inter-
ests within the country, increasing the risk of disaffection and instability within the 
country. It further suggests that the central government can, on a whim, downgrade 
a fully functional state into a centrally governed union territory. The move, in this 
sense, is fully in consonance with the BJP’s stated aim of transforming India into 
a strong, centralised, unitary Hindu Rashtra (literally “kingdom,” “realm,” or “em-
pire,” but rendered contemporarily as “state” or “nation-state”).
Project “Hindu Rashtra”
At Independence in 1947, India’s claim to Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region, was 
driven at least in part by a desire to bolster its pluralist, secular ethos vis-à-vis Paki-
stan – and to lay a claim to Islam as a part of Indian culture. To secure this purpose 
it was willing to afford the state more autonomy than most others in the Indian 
union. Votaries of Hindu nationalism (or Hindutva), however, opposed this move 
right from the beginning. 
Hindutva as a political philosophy was first self­consciously articulated by 
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1923 book Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? In this 
book Savarkar argued that the only form of nationalism possible in India was Hindu 
nationalism. The Hindu, in turn, was a person who counted the territory of India 
(ironically the territory of then British India) as the land of their forefathers and as 
their holy land (1923: 115) – a formulation that incorporates Buddhists, Jains, and 
Sikhs into the Hindu fold, but explicitly others Muslims, Christians, and Parsis. In 
this sense Hindutva was inimical to all of India’s minority religions to the extent 
that it sought either to assimilate them into the Hindu fold or explicitly othered 
them as foreign to India. 
Hindutva as a political philosophy and ideology emerged in colonial times and 
to an extent acknowledged the need for an anti-colonial struggle against the British; 
its main aim, however, appeared to be to create a united Hindu front against Mus-
lims. Drawing very much on the orientalist history in vogue at the time, proponents 
of Hindutva saw Muslims as the “original” despoilers of an ancient and glorious 
Hindu civilisation. The colonial other was problematic, but even more insidious 
was the Muslim as the internal other. Moreover, the colonial other was a powerful 
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other from which India had much to learn. The quest for a Hindu national identity 
therefore, as Thomas Blom Hansen (1996) points out, was a two-pronged exercise: 
on the one hand it designated the Muslims of India as the antagonistic other, whose 
presence prevented the Indian/Hindu nation from fully coming into being; on the 
other it sought equality with, and even the phantasma of dominance over, the colo-
nial other as the symbolic other from which it sought recognition. 
Savarkar further traced the cause of the Hindus’ repeated “enslavement” 
to their purported lack of unity and supposed weak and accommodative posture 
throughout history. The constitution of a single, cohesive national community that 
brooks no slight has therefore been a key aim of the Hindu nationalist project. The 
(largely) non-violent freedom struggle led by M.K. Gandhi against the British is, in 
this scheme of things, considered to be a continuation of this same weakness that 
first brought India to its knees – as are postcolonial India’s efforts to accommodate 
difference and promote diversity. A former president of the BJP, L.K. Advani, for 
instance, referred to India’s policies of minority protection as “appeasement polit-
ics.” The present dispensation’s fealty to this view is evident from the fact that, in 
one of the first speeches that he gave soon after taking oath for the first time in 2014, 
Prime Minister Modi spoke of the need for Indians to overcome“ 1200 years of slave 
mentality.”
In the Hindutva view, therefore, there was no Muslim majority in Kashmir, 
since it was an integral part of Akhand Bharat (unbroken or Entire India), which 
could have only a Hindu majority (see Bhagawan 2008). Further, Kashmir is articu-
lated as the land of Hindu gods and goddesses that needs to be recovered from the 
Islamic occupiers. Such a narrative entirely fails to account for the gradual Islami-
sation of Kashmir since the thirteenth century AD. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS; 
Indian Peoples union), the precursor of the BJP, launched an agitation against Ar-
ticle 370 soon after its inception in 1951. In fact, the founder of BJS, Syama Prasad 
Mookherjee, who died of a heart attack in prison in 1953 while protesting the ar-
ticle, is referred to on the BJP’s website as “a martyr leading the movement for 
complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir.” The revocation of the article has 
thus been on the agenda of the BJP since its inception. The exigencies of coalition 
politics, however, ensured that this issue remained on the back burner – until now. 
It is therefore no surprise that the BJP has implemented its long-standing com-
mitment to dismantling the autonomy in principle enjoyed by Kashmir now that it 
is in majority in the parliament. Yet the manner in which the decision was executed 
signals that the party is now unwilling to even pay lip service to democratic norms 
and constitutional niceties in its project to transform India into a highly centralised 
majoritarian Hindu Rashtra or state. 
Majoritarian Politics
Indeed, this decision is in step with the BJP government’s other initiatives since 
being ushered into power with a large majority in 2014, followed by an even greater 
majority in the subsequent 2019 general elections. In its manner of execution, it is 
most reminiscent of Prime Minister Modi’s surprise announcement on the evening 
of 8 November 2016 that Indian currency notes of the denomination of INR 1,000 
and INR 500 (roughly equivalent to EuR 12.60 and EuR 6.30, respectively) would 
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from midnight of that same date cease to be legal tender. The aim, he said, was to 
curtail India’s shadow economy. Given that India is primarily a cash-based econ-
omy, this move led to untold misery as a result of the prolonged cash shortage in 
the following weeks. It also set back India’s industrial production and GDP growth. 
The aim of recovering black money was also not met (BBC News 2017). Despite this, 
however, the move allowed the prime minister to project himself as a strong and 
decisive leader willing to take tough and potentially unpopular decisions. 
In its previous term, the government had introduced a Citizenship Amendment 
Bill that sought to introduce a religious basis for Indian citizenship (Medha 2016). 
While the amendment did not go through then owing to the BJP’s lack of requisite 
strength in the upper house of the parliament, it is likely to be pushed through this 
time. Since taking the reins of power for the second time in late May this year, the 
BJP has used its majority to rush a spate of contentious legislation through the par-
liament, bypassing parliamentary deliberation and scrutiny. These laws include the 
dilution of India’s hard-won Right to Information Act and legislation that allows the 
government to designate individuals as terrorists and seize their property. As many 
as 33 bills have been passed by the parliament in its first session. While opposition 
members have critiqued this modus operandi, the prime minister emphasised the 
efficiency and decisiveness with which parliamentary business was being conducted 
in his Independence Day address to the nation on 15 August 2019.
The decision on Kashmir has definitely galvanised the BJP’s Hindu majoritar-
ian voter base, which has greeted the move with triumphant euphoria. There is a 
distinct glee with which people and a number of pro-government newspapers and 
television channels have responded to the removal of the special status of India’s 
only Muslim-majority province. This is evident from a number of tweets and Whats-
App messages that appeared within hours of the announcement by the home minis-
ter expressing joy over the fact that people could now buy land in “the paradise on 
Earth” (as Kashmir is often termed). They also claimed that they could now marry 
“those fair Kashmiri women” – a claim that is as bizarre as it is telling. Bizarre 
because there has never been any prohibition on inter-marrying; telling because 
the project of Hindu nationalism has always been about the exercise of masculine 
 power through control and ownership of women (see for instance Sarkar 2001). 
This claim was repeated by at least two BJP leaders, including a presiding chief 
minister, who joked about how “we can now bring girls from Kashmir also” (Scroll 
2019). In fact, an entire new sub-genre of songs celebrating a claim to Kashmiri 
brides and land has emerged on YouTube (see for instance Scroll 2019). 
The question of the consent of these women, like that of the population of Kash-
mir, is of course never even considered. The government seems to have determined 
that its actions, no matter how much they violate democratic norms, will be of little 
electoral cost since they appear to represent the “will of the people.” To this extent, 
therefore, the BJP has interpreted its huge mandate as a mandate to fulfil its project 
of transforming India into a Hindu Nation.
International Ramifications 
The matter of Kashmir, despite the Indian government’s assertion to the contrary, 
is of course not simply a matter internal to India. Pakistan, which controls a signifi-
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cant proportion of the territory as a result of its incursion in 1947, has never given 
up its claim to it. The two countries have fought four major wars (in 1947, 1965, 
1971, and 1999) over the issue and there is a near permanent low­intensity conflict 
across the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Indian-held Kashmir from the territory 
held by Pakistan. Another party to the conflict is China, which lays claim to and 
controls the Aksai Chin plateau in the north-east of Kashmir. India, Pakistan, and 
China are all nuclear powers. 
Hours after the announcement on Kashmir, Pakistan lodged a strong protest, 
withdrew its ambassador from India, and downgraded its diplomatic and trade re-
lations with the country. China, too, issued a warning that India’s unilateral chang-
ing of the boundaries of a contested region constituted an act of aggression. Paki-
stan also lodged a complaint in the united Nations Security Council (uNSC), where 
the matter was discussed in a closed-door session. So far India’s response has been 
to insist that its actions on Kashmir are simply administrative measures internal to 
India. Even as the uNSC emphasised the need for bilateral talks between India and 
Pakistan (CNN 2019), India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, asserted that India 
would speak to Pakistan only about “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir,” India’s term for 
the portion of Kashmir held by Pakistan (Pakistan, in turn, refers to this as Azad – 
or free – Kashmir). He also said that India’s unofficial “no­first­use” doctrine with 
respect to nuclear weapons was not set in stone (Express Web Desk 2019).
under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, India has increasingly taken publicly 
belligerent stances on issues associated with what it deems national security. For 
instance, in February 2019, in response to a cross-border terrorist attack on a mili-
tary convoy in Kashmir, India claimed to have conducted raids destroying terror 
camps deep inside Pakistan’s territory, creating a war-like situation that lasted for 
weeks. In the election campaign weeks after the purported strikes in Pakistan, PM 
Modi boasted that it was in his nature to “settle all scores” and that his principle 
was to “enter their houses to kill them” (Kateshiya and Ghosh 2019). Given such 
an approach, the situation with Pakistan could deteriorate very easily and quickly.
Within Kashmir, too, the BJP-led government has, since taking the reins of 
power in 2014, disturbed the fragile and uneasy peace that had taken hold in the 
valley, responding to even routine protests with excessive use of force. It wilfully 
ignored UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCR) reports on 
human rights violations in the province (Chaudhury 2019) and went ahead and in-
stituted an unprecedented lockdown in Kashmir in the lead up to the announce-
ment of 5 August. In the present scenario, the Indian government has argued that 
all trouble in Kashmir was a result of its autonomy. The revocation of Article 370, 
it argues, will put an end to separatist sentiment, end cross-border terrorism, and 
lead to development and ultimately peace in the valley. The fact of the matter is that 
the Indian government’s actions have completely undermined the position of pro-
India unionist parties in Kashmir and reinforced the beliefs of those who wanted to 
separate from the country. In keeping the population of Kashmir under prolonged 
lockdown, it is perhaps hoping that it will be able to wear down the resistance. Given 
the history of Kashmir and the depth of the alienation of people there (for a report 
of the situation on the ground see report by Drèze et al. 2019), this is unlikely. In the 
long term the desire to break away from India is bound to grow, providing a boost 
to the low-intensity insurgency in place there. Pakistan’s attempts at cross-border 
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interventions are likely to find increased local support, and the region is also likely 
to become susceptible to intervention by non-state Islamic actors. 
The Indian government cannot but be aware of the long-term impact of its 
move on the ground in Kashmir. This only implies that it is willing to continue 
its suppression of any expression of dissent in the valley for as long as necessary. 
While this is likely not to bother its Hindu nationalist voter base domestically, it 
also seems to have calculated that its emerging power status and potential to be a 
“democratic” bulwark against authoritarian China implies that it will not face much 
international opprobrium either. 
Indeed, four permanent members of the uNSC – the uS, the uK, Russia, and 
France – seem to have accepted India’s stance that the issue is internal to India 
and urged India and Pakistan to solve this bilaterally. Even China’s dissent relates 
merely to the reorganisation of the Ladakh region to which Aksai Chin, the territory 
it claims, belongs (CNN 2019). 
An Increasingly Assertive Hindu Nationalist Foreign Policy
until recently, India has drawn upon the history of its largely non-violent inde-
pendence struggle and the perceived democratic nature of its polity to construct 
for itself the position of a moral actor in world politics. It has presented itself as 
a responsible global citizen and an advocate for other developing nations. Its ap-
proach towards conflict management has been to emphasise, at least ostensibly, 
a willingness for reconciliation, strategic restraint, and the propensity to take the 
moral high ground. An example of this is the country’s “no­first­use” doctrine with 
respect to nuclear weapons. In each of its wars with Pakistan, India has emphasised 
that it was Pakistan that was the initiator of the conflict.
In the Hindu nationalist scheme of things, such a stance is seen as expressing 
weakness and a lack of resolve. As pointed out previously, under PM Modi, India 
appears to have become more willing to act as the initiator of conflict, at least in 
situations that it views as having a bearing on India’s security. India’s assertive 
behaviour in its immediate neighbourhood, in turn, is presented as demonstrating 
to the world that it will not take any threats lying down and as a sign that it is no 
longer willing to play the pushover. It has been helped in this by its status as an 
emerging power with a large market. Its prior efforts at building a reputation as a 
restrained actor at the receiving end of aggression from Pakistan and China have 
ironically led the international community to give it the benefit of doubt. German 
and European policymakers have also often ignored the Hindu nationalist BJP’s 
contentious domestic policies as they have sought to prop up “the world’s largest 
democracy” against China.
The closed-door meeting that the uNSC held on the topic of Kashmir in re-
sponse to Pakistan’s complaint, for instance, failed to even come up with a joint 
press statement. It has been reported that the 15 member countries of the uNSC 
were concerned that by the very fact of holding a meeting they were exhibiting bias 
towards Pakistan – and that France, Germany, and the united States were not com-
fortable with any language that might make it seem that the uNSC was broadening 
the scope of the dispute beyond that of a bilateral dispute between India and Pa-
kistan (CNN 2019). This simply reinforces India’s calculation that it is unlikely to 
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face any material consequences for this move. European and German policymakers 
can expect that India will increasingly take a more aggressive and uncompromising 
stance in world politics. While previously a desire to be perceived as “a moral actor” 
and “a responsible citizen of the world” had an influence on India’s policies, this is 
unlikely to be a consideration in the future. 
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